Founded October 12, 1912 
Inaugurated December 29, 1915 


ad 


Return this book on or before the +4) 10!/5 LIBRARY 
Latest Date stamped below. “24 


[27.1918 © 


University of Illinois Library 
BPR —& 195) 


Bia Ae s of Nations 


Rights 


L161—H41 


ee ee geitin ea one 


Er See See A ; 
iy. Te et PT a GRA ee 
# 


Rr eh a 


Ste ae 


ORE pn ERE sill Ae 
Seeiastoh:* 5 


ea 


Mi 


5) 
vag 
¥ 


— | The national Law 


URIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY 


NOV 27 1918 


Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations 


Official Commentary Upon the Rights 
and Duties of Nations 


Constitution and By-Laws 


Officers and Members 


COMMENDATION OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTER- 
NATIONAL LAW BY OFFICIAL ASSEMBLIES OF A LEGAL, 
POLITICAL AND SCIENTIFIC NATURE, COMPOSED OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS. 


The Third Committee of the Commission of American Jurists, 
which met at Rio de Janeiro to consider the codification of inter- 
national law, at its meeting of July 16, 1912, adopted a resolution: 


Commending the initiative taken to found an American In- 
stitute of International Law, as the Committee considers an 
institution of this kind of great usefulness to assist in the work_ 
of codification that the statesmen of the New World have in 
view. 


The Governing Board of the Pan American Union, at its meeting 
held in the City of Washington on December 1, 1915, unanimously 
adopted the following resolution: 


Whereas the official inauguration of the American Institute 
of International Law, founded in Washington October 12, 1912, 
is soon to take place under the auspices of the Second Pan 
American Scientific Congress, and 
Whereas said Institute, consisting of representatives of every \ 
one of the American Republics, recommended by the International 
Law Associations of their respective countries, will result in 
strengthening, through the active codperation of jurists and 
thinkers of the whole continent, the bonds of friendship and 
union now existing between these Republics, and will contribute 
to the development of a common sentiment of international 
justice among them, 
The Governing Board of the Pan American Union 
Resolves to tender to the founders and members of the Amer- 
ican Institute of International Law a vote of commendation and 
encouragement for the foundation of said organization, which 
represents a step of the highest important in the moral ad- 
vancement of the continent and in the strengthening of the 
sentiments of friendship and harmcay among the Republics. 


The Second Pan American Scientific Congress, which met at 
Washington December 27, 1915-January 8, 1916, adopted the fol- 


lowing resolution, which is included in its Final Act: | 
The Second Pan American Scientific Congress extends to the 
American Institute of International Law a cordial welcome into 
the circles of scientific organizations of Pan America, and 


records a sincere wish for its successful career and the achieve- 
ment of the highest aims of its important labors. 


UNIVERSITY OF TLLINDIS LIBRARY 
NOV 27 1918 
The American Institute of International Law 


Founded October 12, 1912 
Inaugurated December 29, 1915 


Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations 


Official Commentary Upon the Rights 
and Duties of Nations 


Constitution and By-Laws 


Officers and Members 


saa PRRAAL,, n 


A ry ; A. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations...... 1 
Official Commentary upon the Declaration of the Rights 
PUCCIO, On NATIONS eee gabe sa loth teeade A gl 2a 3 
Constitution of the American Institute of International 
PERE VRP E EY OeTANe Gi wec Ad MMe a tL WeamaLKES MA ner Sha llad Nana a a Leg 16 


By-laws of the American Institute of International Law 22 
Officers and Memhers of the American Institute of Inter- 
Fahey me 6S 6s Oe) bits hae CERRR, Sty CERNE ORTON ROR RUC RaE ALAA fea 8 29 


DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NATIONS 
adopted by the American Institute of International Law at 
its first session in the City of Washington, January 6, 1916 


WHEREAS the municipal law of civilized nations recognizes 
and protects the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the 
pursuit of happiness, as added by the Declaration of Independence 
of the United States of America, the right to legal equality, the right 
to property, and the right to the enjoyment of the aforesaid rights; 
and 2 

WHEREAS these fundamental rights, thus universally recog- 
nized, create a duty on the part of the peoples of all nations to ob- 
serve them; and 

WHEREAS, according to the political philosophy of the Declara- 
tion of Independence of the United States, and the universal prac- 
tice of the American Republics, nations or governments are re- 
garded as created by the people, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed, and are instituted among men to promote 
their safety and happiness and to secure to the people the enjoyment 
of their fundamental rights; and 

WHEREAS the nation is a moral or juristic person, the creature 
of law, and subordinated to law as is the natural person in political 
society ; and 

WHEREAS we deem that these fundamental rights can be stated 
in terms of international law and applied to the relations of the 
members of the society of nations, one with another, just as they 
have been applied in the relations of the citizens or subjects of the 
states forming the Society of Nations; and | 

WHEREAS these fundamental rights of national jurisprudence, 
namely, the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the pursuit 
of happiness, the right to equality before the law, the right to prop- 
erty, and the right to the observance thereof are, when stated in 
terms of international law, the right of the nation to exist and to 
protect and to conserve its existence; the right of independence and 
the freedom to develop itself without interference or control from 
other nations; the right of equality in law and before law; the right 
to territory within defined boundaries and to exclusive jurisdiction 
therein; and the right to the observance of these fundamental 
rights; and 

WHEREAS the rights and the duties of nations are, by virtue 
of membership in the society thereof, to be exercised and performed 
in accordance with the exigencies of their mutual Interdependence 
expressed in the preamble to the Convention for the Pacific Settle- 
ment of International Disputes of the First and Second Hague 
Peace Conferences, recognizing the solidarity which unites the mem- 
bers of the society of civilized nations; 


2 


THEREFORE, Ture AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNA- 
TIONAL Law, at its first session, held in the City of Washing- 
ton, in the United States of America, on the sixth day of Jan- 
uary, 1916, adopts the following six articles, together with the 
commentary thereon, to be known as its 


Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations. 


I. Every nation has the right to exist, and to protect 
and to conserve its existence; but this right neither im- 
plies the right nor justifies the act of the state to protect 
itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of 
unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states. 


II. Every nation has the right to independence in the 
sense that, it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is 
free to develop itself without interference or control from 
other states, provided that in so doing it does not inter- 
fere with or violate the rights of other states. 


III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of 
every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and 
all nations have the right to claim and, according to the 
Declaration of Independence of the United States, “to as- 
sume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and 
equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s 
God entitle them.” 


IV. Every nation has the right to territory within de- 
fined boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
over its territory, and all persons whether native or 
foreign found therein. 


V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations 
is entitled to have that right respected and protected by 
all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and 
the right of one is the duty of all to observe. 


VI. International law is at one and the same time both 
national and international: national in the sense that it is 
the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision 
of all questions involving its principles; international in the 
sense that it is the law of the society of nations and appli- 
cable as such to all questions between and among the mem- 
bers of the society of nations involving its principles. 


Official Commentary upon the Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Nations, adopted January 6, 
1916. 


I. Every nation has the right to exist, and to protect 
and to conserve its existence; but this right neither im- 
plies the right nor justifies the act of the state to protect 
itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of 
unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states. 

This right is to be understood in the sense in which the 
right to life is understood in national law, according to which 
it is unlawful for a human being to take human life, unless 
it be necessary so to do in self-defense against an unlawful 
attack threatening the life of the party unlawfully attacked. 

In the Chinese Exclusion Case (reported in 130 United 
States Reports, pp. 581, 606), decided by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in 1888, Mr. Justice Field said for the 
Court: 


To preserve its independence, and give security against 
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty 
of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other 
considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in 
what form such aggression and encroachment come, 
whether from the foreign nation acting in its national 
character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in 
upon us. The government, possessing the powers which 
are to be exercised for protection and security, is clothed 
with authority to determine the occasion on which the 
powers shall be called forth; and its determination, so 
far as the subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily 
conclusive upon all its departments and officers. 


The right of a state to exist and to protect and to conserve 
its existence is to be understood in the sense in which the 
right of.an individual to his life was defined, interpreted and 
applied in terms applicable alike to nations and individuals 


4 


in the well known English case of Regina vs. Dudley (re- 
ported in 15 Cox’s Criminal Cases, p. 624; 14 Queen’s Bench 
Division, p. 273), decided by the Queen’s Bench Division of 
the High Court of Justice in 1884, to the effect that it was 
unlawful for shipwrecked sailors to take the life of one of 
their number, in order to preserve their own lives, because it 
was unlawful according to the common law of England for 
an English subject to take human life, unless to defend him- 
self against an unlawful attack of the assailant threatening 
the life of the party unlawfully attacked. 

The right of a State to exist and to protect and to conserve 
its existence, as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, is recognized not merely in the United States but in 
Latin America, as appears from the views of the well-known 
publicists, Messrs. Bello and Calvo, who may be considered 
representative of Latin American thought and practice. 

Thus Bello, writing in 1832, said: 


There is no doubt that every nation has the right of 
self-preservation and is entitled to take protective meas- 
ures against any danger whatsoever; but this danger must 
be great, manifest and imminent, in order to make it 
lawful for us to exact by force that another nation alter 
its institutions for our benefit. (Andrés Bello, Principios 
de Derecho de Jentes, part 1, chap. 1, VII.) 


And Calvo, half a century later, said: 


One of the essential rights inherent in the sovereignty 
nd the independence of States is that of self-preserva- 
tion. This right is the first of all absolute or permanent 
rights and is the fundamental basis of a great number 
of accessory, secondary, or occasional rights. We may 
say that it constitutes the supreme law of nations, as well 
as the most imperative duty of citizens, and a society that 
fails to repel aggression from without neglects its moral 
duties toward its members and fails to live up to the very 
purpose of its institution. (Carlos Calvo, Le Droit Inter- 
national Théorique et Pratique, 5th ed., Vol. 1, § 208.) 


II. Every nation has the right to independence in the 
sense that, it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is 
free to develop itself without interference or control from 
other states, provided that in so doing it does not inter- 
fere with or violate the rights of other states. 

III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of 
every other state composing the society of nations, and 
all nations have the right to claim and, according to the 
Declaration of Independence of the United States, “to as- 
sume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and 
equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s 
God entitle them.” 

The right to independence and its necessary corollary, equal- 
ity, is to be understood in the sense in which it was defined in 
the following passage quoted from the decision of the great 
English admiralty judge, Sir William Scott, later Lord 
Stowell, in the case of The Louis (reported in 2 Dodson’s 
Reports, pp. 210, 243-44), decided in 1817: 

Two principles of public law are generally recognized 
as fundamental. One is the perfect equality and entire 
independence of all distinct states. Relative magnitude 
creates no distinction of right; relative imbecility, 
whether permanent or casual, gives no additional right 
to the more powerful neighbor; and any advantage seized 
upon that ground is mere usurpation. This is the great 
foundation of public law, which it mainly concerns the 
peace of mankind, both in their politic and private capaci- 
ties, to preserve inviolate. The second is, that all nations 
being equal, all have an equal right to the uninterrupted 
use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their 
navigation. In places where no local authority exists, 
where the subjects of all states meet upon a footing of 
entire equality and independence, no one state, or any of 
its subjects, has a right to assume or exercise authority 
over the subjects of another. 


The right of equality is also to be understood in the sense 
in which it was stated and illustrated by John Marshall, Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, who said, 


6 


in deciding the case of The Antelope, in 1825 (reported in 
10 Wheaton’s Reports, pp. 66, 122): 


In this commerce thus sanctioned by universal assent, 
every nation had an equal right to engage. How is this 
right to be lost? Each may renounce it for its own 
people; but can this renunciation affect others? 

No principle of general law is more universally ac- 
knowledged, than the perfect equality of nations. Russia 
and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this 
equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on 
another. Lach legislates for itself, but its legislation can 
operate on itself alone. A right, then, which is vested in 
all, by the consent of all, can be divested only by consent; 
and this [slave] trade, in which all have participated, 
must remain lawful to those who can not be induced to 
relinquish it. As no nation can prescribe a rule for 
others, none can make a law of nations; and this traffic 
remains lawful to those whose governments have not 
forbidden it. 


The right of equality is further to be understood in the 
sense in which it was expressed and illustrated by Mr. Elihu 
Root, in the following passage from the address which he 
delivered, when Secretary of State of the United States, and 
in the presence of the official delegates of the American Re- 
publics accredited to the Third Pan-American Conference held 
at Rio de Janeiro on July 31, 1906: 


We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no 
territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the 
sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence 
and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of 
the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those 
of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of 
that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the 
oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire 
any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely 
concede to every American Republic. We wish to in- 
crease our prosperity, to expand our trade, to grow in 
wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit, but our conception of 


7 


the true way to accomplish this is not to pull down others 
and profit by their ruin, but to help all friends to a com- 
mon prosperity and a common growth, that we may all 
become greater and stronger together. 


It would seem that the measured judgments of Lord Stowell 
and of Chief Justice Marshall, not to speak of Mr. Root’s 
opinion, given as Secretary of State, are sufficient to estab- 
lish a principle of international law, and that it is unneces- 
sary to cite other authorities, if the ones already quoted fail 
to produce conviction. In order to show, however, that inde- 
pendence and equality are the law of the American Continent, 
the authority of the two great Latin-American publicists may 
be again invoked. 

Thus, Bello says: 


From the independence and the sovereignty of nations 
it follows that no one nation is permitted to dictate to 
any other nation the form of government, of religion, or 
of administration that it must adopt, or to hold it ac- 
countable for the relations between its citizens or those 
between the government and its subjects. (Bello, Prin- 
cipios de Derecho de Jentes, part 1, chap. 1, VII.) 


All men being equal, the groups of men composing 
universal society are equal. The weakest republic enjoys 
the same rights and is subject to the same duties as the 
mightiest empire. (Bello, Principios de Derecho de Jentes, 
part 1, chap. 1, II.) 


And to the same effect, but more at length, Calvo says: 


States possess, by virtue of the law of their organiza- 
tion and of their sovereignty, their own exclusive and 
particular sphere of action. In this respect, they depend 
upon no one and are bound to provide for the mainte- 
nance of those rights and for the observance of those 
duties alone which are the fundamental and necessary 
basis of every free society. Absolute sovereignty neces- 
sarily implies complete independence. Hence States, in 
so far as they are moral persons, have a fundamental 
right: the right of freely carrying out their destinies; and 


8 


a duty that is no less imperative: the duty of recognizing 
and of respecting the sovereign rights and the absolute 
independence of other States. (Calvo, Le Droit Inter- 
national Théorique et Pratique, 5th ed., Vol. I, § 107.) 


The equality of sovereign States is a generally recog- 
nized principle of public law. It has the twofold conse- 
quence of giving all States the same rights and of impos- 
ing upon them the same mutual duties. The relative size 
of their territories cannot justify, in this regard, the 
slightest difference or the slightest distinction be- 
tween nations considered as moral persons, and,. 
from the point of view of. international law, as 
well as from that of equity, what is lawful or un- 
just for one State is likewise lawful or unjust for all 
others. “Nothing can be done to a small or weak nation,” 
said Mr. Sumner in the United States Senate on March 
23, 1871, “that would not be done to a large or powerful 
nation, or that we would not allow to be done to our- 
selves.” (Calvo, Le Drott International Théorique et 
Pratique, 5th ed., Vol. I, § 210.) 


IV. Every nation has the right to territory within de- 
fined boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
over its territory, and all persons whether native or 
foreign found therein. 

This right is to be understood in the sense in which it was 
stated by Chief Justice Marshall tn the following passage of 
his judgment in the case of the schooner Exchange (reported 
in 7 Cranch’s Reports, pp. 116, 136-7), decided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the year 1812: 


The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, 
is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no 
limitation, not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, 
deriving validity from an external source, would imply 
a diminution of its sovereignty, to the extent of the 
restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty, to the 
same extent, in that power which could impose such re- 
striction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and com- 
plete power of a nation, within its own territories, must 


9 


be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can 
flow from no other legitimate source. 

This consent may be either express or implied. In the 
latter case, it is less determinate, exposed more to the 
uncertainties of construction; but, if understood, not less 
obligatory. The world being composed of distinct sov- 
ereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence, 
whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with 
each other, and by an interchange of those good offices 
which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sover- 
eignties have consented to a relaxation, in practice, in 
cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that abso- 
lute and complete jurisdiction within their respective ter- 
ritories which sovereignty confers. This consent may, in 
some instances, be tested by common usage, and by com- 
mon opinion, growing out of that usage. A nation would 
justly be considered as violating its faith, although that 
faith might not be expressly plighted, which should sud- 
denly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial 
powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and 
received obligations of the civilized world. * * * * 

This perfect equality and absolute independence of sov- 
ereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mu- 
tual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with 
each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which 
every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a 
part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, 
which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation. 


In view of the fulness of Chief Justice Marshall’s exposi- 
tion of this right and its consequences, and in view also of the 
acceptance of The Exchange as an authority in every civilized 
country, both as to the right and its limitation, it does not seem 
necessary to quote statements of Latin-American publicists, in 
order to sustain what may be called the obvious, and which is _ 
deeply imbedded in the legislation of the American Republics. 

In lieu of many illustrations that might be drawn from the 
civil codes of the Latin-American States, one will suffice, 
namely, Article 14 of the civil code of Chile, which declares 
that, 


10 


the law is binding upon all the inhabitants of the Repub- 
lic, including foreigners. 


V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations 
is entitled to have that right respected and protected by 
all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and 
the right of one is the duty of all to observe. 

This right is to be understood in the sense in which it was 
stated in the following passage from the judgment of Chief 
Justice Waite in the case of United States vs. Arjona (reported 
in 120 United States Reports, pp. 479, 487), decided by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in 1886, holding that 
as each nation had by international law the exclusive right to 
fix its standard of money, it was the duty of the United States 
as a member of the Society of Nations to protect the money of 
a foreign country, in this case Colombia, from forgery: 


But if the United States can require this of another, 
that other may require it of them, because international 
obligations are of necessity reciprocal in their nature. The 
right, if it exists at all, is given by the law of nations, 
and what is law for one is, under the same circumstances, 
law for the other. A right secured by the law of nations 
to a nation, or its people, is one the United States as 
the representatives of this nation are bound to protect. 


VI. International law is at one and the same time both 
national and international: national in the sense that it is 
the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision 
of all questions involving its principles; international in the 
sense that it is the law of the society of nations and appli- 
cable as such to all questions between and among the mem- 
bers of the society of nations involving its principles. 

International law, then called the law of nations, was de- 
clared by judges and commentators before the Declaration of 
Independence of the United States to form an integral part 
of the common law of England, and by judges and commen- 


11 


tators of the United States as adopted at one and the same time 
with the adoption of the common law of which it formed an 
integral part. Thus, in the case of Buvot v. Barbuit (reported 
in Cases Tempore Talbot, p. 281), decided by Lord Chancellor 
Talbot in 1733, that distinguished judge and upright man is 
reported by Lord Mansfield, who was then the ornament of 
the bar and was counsel in the case, to have said: 


That the law of nations, in its full extent, was part of 
the law of England. That the act of Parliament was de- 
claratory, and occasioned by a particular incident. That 
the law of nations was to be collected from the practice 
of different nations, and the authority of writers. 


In the case of Triquet v. Bath (reported in 3 Burrow, p. 
1478), decided by the Court of King’s Bench in 1764, Lord 
Chief Justice Mansfield held, quoting the judgment of Lord 
Talbot in Buvot v. Barbuit, that the law of nations was part 
of the law of England; and three years later, in the leading 
case of Heathfield v. Chilton (reported in 4 Burrow, p. 2015), 
Lord Chief Justice Mansfield reiterated his opinion, stating 
that, 


the privileges of public ministers and their retinue depend 
upon the law of nations; which is part of the common law 
of England. And the act of Parliament of 7 Ann. c. 12 
did not intend to alter, nor can alter the law of nations. 


The distinguished commentator, Sir William Blackstone, 
who had been counsel in both these cases tried before Lord 
Mansfield, wrote in the first edition of the fourth volume of 
his Commentaries upon the Laws of England, published in 
1769, that: | 


The law of nations (wherever any question arises which 
is properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted 
in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a 


12 


part of the law of the land. And those acts of Parlia- 
ment, which have from time to time been made to enforce 
this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of its de- 
cisions, are not to be considered as introductive of any | 

~new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old funda- 
mental constitutions of the Kingdom; without which it 
must cease to be a part of the civilized world. 


In accordance with the views of English judges interpreting 
and applying the Common Law and in reliance upon the ex- 
press language of the illustrious English commentator from 
whom they had learned their law, the Revolutionary statesmen 
of North America understood and stated that international law 
was a part of the law of the United States. Thus, Thomas Jef- 
ferson, Secretary of State under Washington’s Administration, 
referred in the year 1793 to “the laws of the land, of which the 
law of nations makes an integral part.’’ (American State 
Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, p. 150.) His great opponent, 
Alexander Hamilton, differing in most respects from Thomas 
Jefferson, nevertheless concurred in the view that international 
law was a part of the law of the land, and explained it more 
elaborately than Mr. Jefferson in the following passage quoted 
from the essays which Hamilton, under the pseudonym of 
Camillus, wrote for the Press in 1795 in defense of the Jay 
Treaty: 


A question may be raised—Does this customary law 
of nations, as established in Europe, bind the United 
States? An affirmative answer to this is warranted by 

- conclusive reasons. 

1. The United States, when a member of the British 
[E-mpire, were, in this capacity, a party to that law, and not 
having dissented from it, when they became independent, 
they are to be considered as having continued a party 
to it. 

2. The common law of England, which was and is in 
force in each of these States, adopts the law of nations, 
the positive equally with the natural, as a part of itself. 


13 


3. Ever since we have been an independent nation, we 
have appealed to and acted upon the modern law of nations, 
as understood in Europe—various resolutions of Congress 
during our Revolution, the correspondence of executive of- 
ficers, the decisions of our courts of admiralty, all recog- 
nize this standard. 

4, Executive and legislative acts, and the proceedings 
of our courts, under the present government, speak a simi- 
lar language. The President’s proclamation of neutrality 
refers expressly to the modern law of nations, which must 
necessarily be understood as that prevailing in Europe, and 
acceded to by this country; and the general voice of our 
nation, together with the very arguments used against the 
treaty, accord in the same point. It is indubitable, that 
the customary law of European nations is as a part of the 
common law, and, by adoption, that of the United States. 
(Lodge’s “Works of Alexander Hamilton,” 1885, Vol. 
V, pp. 89-90.) 


A recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
defines the relation of international law to the law of the land 
as it was stated by Sir William Blackstone in his Commentaries 
published before the American Revolution. Thus, in the case 
of The Paquete Habana (reported in 175 United States Re- 
ports, pp. 677, 700), decided in 1899, Mr. Justice Gray, deliv- 
ering the opinion of the Court, said: 


International law is part of our law, and must be ascer- 
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appro- 
priate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depend- 
ing upon it are duly presented for their determination. 
For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no con- 
trolling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, 
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists 


and commentators, who, by years of labor, research, and - 


experience, have made themselves peculiarly well ac- 
quainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such 
works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law 
ought to be but for trustworthy evidence of what the law 
really is. 


14 


It may be said in summing up the relation of inter- 
national law to the common law of England and to the 
municipal law of the United States, that international law is 
part of the English common law; that as such it passed with 
the English colonies to America; that when, in consequence 
of successful rebellion, they were admitted to the society 
of nations, the new Republic recognized international law as 
completely as international law recognized the new Republic. 
Municipal law it was in England; municipal law it remained 
and is in the United States. Without expressing an opinion 
upon the vexed question whether it is law in the abstract, the 
courts, State and Federal, take judicial cognizance of its exist- 
ence, and in appropriate cases enforce it, so that for the Amer- 
ican student or practitioner international is domestic or muni- 
cipal law. 

The constitutions of certain Latin-American States ex- 
pressly lay down the principle of Anglo-American law that 
international law is part of the law of the land. Thus, Article 
106 of the constitution of the Dominican Republic and Arti- 
cle 125 of the constitution of Venezuela, which admits the prin- 
ciple with certain limitations. The constitution of Colombia 
of 1863 expressly declared that “The law of nations forms 
part of the national legislation,’ and an eminent American 
publicist specially versed in such matters states that “the au- 
thorities of the country are understood, in their treatment of 
neutrality and other questions, to have acknowledged the con- 
tinuing force of the principle.” In other constitutions of the 
American Republics the principle is not stated in express 
terms. It is, however, recognized implicitly or for specific 
cases; for example, Articles 31, 100, and 101 of the constitu- 
tion of Argentina; Articles 59, 60, and 61 of the constitution 
of Brazil; Article 73 of the constitution of Chile; Article 107 
of the constitution of Honduras; Article 96 of the constitution 
of Uruguay, etc., etc. 

The laws of Latin-American countries—notably those re- 
lating to judicial procedure or to the organization of judicial 


15 


authority—recognize, expressly or implicitly, the principle in 
question. In all the American countries the rules of inter- 
national law have been treated as in force in their proclama- 
tions of neutrality in the great European war. 

In future it must be expressly admitted as the basis of 
the public law of the New World that international law is part 
of the national legislation of every country. This is not only 
a principle of justice but one that is necessary to facilitate and 
to strengthen the friendly relations of all States. 


The following impressive language of an eminent citizen of 
the American continent, Daniel Webster, to be found in an 
official instruction written when he was Secretary of State of 
the United States of America, may be quoted as a statement 
in summary form of the rights and duties of nations, especially 
of the American Republics: 


Every nation, on being received, at her own request, 
into the circle of civilized governments, must understand 
that she not only attains rights of sovereignty and the 
dignity of national character, but that she binds herself to 
the strict and faithful observance of all those princi- 
ples, laws, and usages which have obtained currency 
among civilized states, and which have for their object 
the mitigation of the miseries of war. 


CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 


ARTICLE I. Name 


An association is founded to be known as the American 
Institute of International Law. 


ARTICLE II. Object 


The American Institute of International Law is an unof- 
ficial scientific association. 

It proposes: 

1. To give precision to the general principles of interna- 
tional law as they now exist, or to formulate new ones, in 
conformity with the solidarity which unites the members of 
the society of civilized nations, in order to strengthen these 
bonds and, especially, the bonds between the American peoples; 

2. To study questions of international law, particularly 
questions of an American character, and to endeavor to 
solve them, either in conformity with generally accepted prin- 
ciples, or by extending and developing them, or by creating 
new principles adapted to the special needs of the American 
Continent ; 

3. To discover a method of codifying the general or special 
principles of international law, and to elaborate projects of 
codification on matters which lend themselves thereto; 

4. To aid in bringing about the triumph of the principles 
of justice and of humanity which should govern the relations 
between peoples, considered as nations, through more exten- 
sive instruction in international law, particularly in American 
universities, through lectures and addresses, as well as through 
publications and all other means; 

5. To organize the study of international law along truly 
scientific and practical lines in a way that meets the needs of 
modern life, and taking into account the problems of our hem- 
isphere and American doctrines; 


17 


6. To contribute, within the limits of its competence and 
_the means at its disposal, toward the maintenance of peace, 
or toward the observance of the laws of war and the mitiga- 
tion of the evils thereof; 

7. To increase the sentiment of fraternity among the Re- 
publics of the American Continent, so as to strengthen friend- 
ship and mutual confidence among the citizens of the coun- 
tries of the New World. 


ARTICLE III. Membership 


The American Institute of International Law is composed 
of committees or delegates of the national societies of inter- 
national law established in the different American Republics, 
which are affiliated therewith and of which it is the permanent 
representative. 

It comprises : 


1. Charter members; 

2. Titular members; 

3. Ex officio members; 

4. Corresponding members. 


The charter members are those who accepted this designa- 
tion by signing, in 1912, the draft which has now become the 
present Constitution. 

The titular members, chosen exclusively from among the 
publicists of the different Republics of the American Conti- 
nent, are elected by the Institute, in conformity with the next 
article. No Republic may have more than five such members 
at one and the same time. 

If the secretary general of the national society of inter- 
national law in any one of the American Republics is not 
personally a member of the Institute, he becomes of right a 
member ex officio, that is to say, by virtue of and for the 
term of his office. Ex officio members have, as such, the same 
rights as titular members. 


18 


Jurists of non-American nationality, who, through their 
writings or their activity, shall have contributed to the prog- 
ress of international law, may be elected corresponding 
members. 

Corresponding members are invited to attend all the ses- 
sions of the Institute, with the same rights and privileges as 
American members. They have not, however, the right to 
vote either on administrative or scientific questions. 

They are called upon to give their opinion on questions sub- 
mitted to the consideration of the Institute, and they are 
active collaborators thereof. 

They are exempt from the entrance fee and annual dues. 

No one State can have more than three such members. 


ARTICLE IV. National Societies 


The national societies organized in each American Republic 
tor the study and popularization of international law, whose 
members are jurists versed in international law, may affiliate 
with the American Institute. The members of these societies 
are entitled to attend the sessions of the Institute, but they may 
not take part in its deliberations nor may they vote. 

The affiliated national societies propose duly qualified per- 
sons from among their nationals, for election as titular mem- 
bers by the Institute. | 

The members of the national societies, who are members of 
the Institute, constitute, in their country, a governing com- 
mittee of the said society, which committee is the intellectual 
bond between the national society and the Institute. 

The committee communicates, either directly, or through 
the secretary general of the national society, with the sec- 
retary general of the Institute, and sends him all the trans- 
actions and projects of the said society or informs him of the 
progress that has been made upon them. 

The secretary general of the Institute transmits these trans- 
actions and projects in full, in part, or a synopsis thereof to 
the different national societies. 


19 


ARTICLE V. Officers 


The officers of the Institute are an honorary president, a 
president, a secretary general, and a treasurer. 

Before the close of each session there is an election of an 
honorary president and a president, who remain in office until 
the election of their successors at the following session. 

The application of the foregoing second paragraph is pro- 
visionally suspended until the Institute shall have decided 
otherwise. 

In the elections individual ballots are cast, and only the 
members present are permitted to vote. Nevertheless, absent 
members are allowed to send their votes in writing, in sealed 
envelopes. Candidates must receive a majority of the votes 
of the members present, as well as a majority of all the votes 
validly cast, in order to be elected. 


ArtiIcLe VI. Executive Council 


An Executive Council is the governing body of the In- 
stitute. 

It meets at Washington, the seat of the Institute. 

lt is composed of the president, the secretary general, and 
the treasurer, who are members ex officio, and of two other 
members elected at the beginning of each session. They are 
eligible for re-election. 

It has the right to increase its membership and itself elects 
additional members, if it deems it necessary. 


ArTIcLE VII. Secretary General 


The secretary general is elected by the Institute for three | 
sessions. He is eligible for re-election. 

He has in his charge the drafting of the minutes of each 
meeting, all the publications of the Institute, its routine work, 
its correspondence, and the execution of its decisions, unless 
the Institute provides otherwise. He is keeper of its seal and 


20 


of its archives. At the beginning of each session he presents 
a summary of the work of the preceding session. 


ARTICLE VIII. Assistant Secretaries 


On the proposal of the secretary general, the Institute may 
appoint one or more assistant secretaries, to aid him in the 
performance of his duties or to represent him in his absence. 


ARTICLE IX. Treasurer 


The treasurer is elected for three sessions. He is eligible 
for re-election. 

He has in his charge the financial affairs of the Institute, 
under the control of the Executive Council. He presents a 
detailed report at each session. 

Two members are designated at the first meeting as audi- 
tors, and present, during the session, a report on the result of 
their examination of the treasurer’s accounts. 


ARTICLE X._ Reporters 


The Executive Council submits questions for examination 
and study to the affiliated national societies, or appoints re- 
porters from among its members, or organizes committees for 
the preparatory study of questions that are to be submitted to 
the deliberations of the Institute. 

In urgent cases, the secretary general himself prepares the 
reports. | 

ARTICLE XI. Sessions 


There shall be at least one session of the Institute every two 
years; but the Executive Council may, during this interval, 
call an extra session of the Institute. 

At each session the Institute designates the place and the 
time of the following session. It may leave this designation 
to the Executive Council. 


ARTICLE XII. Languages 


French, the language of the /nstitut de droit international 
and of the Peace Conferences, is likewise the language of the 
Institute. 

Nevertheless the use of Spanish, Portuguese, and English, 
as national languages, is permitted as of right. 

Every official document that is to be published is translated 
into the language or languages selected by the officers. 


ARTICLE XIII. Publication of Proceedings 


After each session, the Institute publishes an account of 
its proceedings. 


ARTICLE XIV. Dues and Funds 


The expenses of the Institute are covered: 

1. By the dues of its members, as well as by an entrance fee. 

The dues are, unless the by-laws provide to the contrary, 
an entrance fee of ten dollars and annual dues of five dollars. 
The dues are payable from and including the year of election. 
They entitle the member to all the publications of the Insti- 
tute. An unjustifiable delay of more than three years in the 
payment of dues may be considered as equivalent to a resig- 
nation. 

2. By foundations and other gifts. 

It is proposed that a fund be gradually formed, the in- 
come from which shall be devoted to the expenses of the 
sessions, of the publications, of the secretariat, and of other 
routine matters. 


ARTICLE XV. Amendments. 


The present constitution may be revised or amended, in 
whole or in part, at a regular session, on the request of a 
majority of the members present and voting. 


BY-LAWS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 


PARTY 
Members 
ARTICLE [| 


The titular members of the Institute are elected by it from 
the list of names presented by the affiliated national society. 


ARTICLE I] 


Where no affiliated national society exists or where the 
existing society neglects to present candidates, the Institute 
provides for nominations or vacancies as it sees fit. 


ARTICLE III 


Corresponding members are elected by the Institute on the 
proposal of the Executive Council, at the meeting devoted 
to the election of titular members. 


PART iI 
Preliminary Work between Sessions 
ARTICLE IV 


By article X of the Constitution the Executive Council 
presents the questions for study, either by laying them before 
the national societies, or by designating two reporters, or one 
reporter and a committee of study for each question. 

In the former case, the subject, with or without a ques- 
tionnaire, is submitted to each national society. 

If two reporters are appointed, each of them prepares a 
memorandum, after which one of them or a third reporter des- 
ignated by the Executive Council prepares a report on the basis 
of and with the assistance of the memoranda presented. 

If a reporter and a committee of study are designated, the 
reporter must get into communication with the members of the 


ok 


committee before the 3lst of December of the year of his 
appointment, and submit his ideas to them and learn their 
views. 

Every member, who signifies his desire to that effect, has 
the right to be a member of such of the committees of study as 
he shall indicate to the secretary general. 


ARTICLE V 


The national societies and the reporters must transmit their 
studies or reports to the secretary general in ample time for 
their publication and distribution before the session at which 
they are to be discussed. 

The secretary general does not provide for the printing or 
distribution of other reports or documents prepared by the 
reporters or by members of committees or of the Institute. 
Such works are published only in exceptional cases and by 
virtue of an express decision on the part of the Institute or 
the Executive Council. 


PART tif 
Sessions 
ARTICLE VI 


There may be no more than one session each year. The in- 
terval between two sessions must not exceed two years. 

At each session the Institute designates the place and time 
of the next session. This designation may be left to the 
Executive Council (Constitution, Article XI). In this case, 
the secretary general informs the national societies affiliated 
with the Institute, at least four months in advance, of the 
place and date determined upon. 


ARTICLE VII 


The program of the session is drawn up by the Executive 
Council, and the secretary general brings it to the attention 
of the national societies as soon as possible. 


24 


The program must be accompanied by the summary of the 
progress made on the preparatory work, as well as by all other 
information that may facilitate the labors of the members 
taking part in the session. 


ARTICLE VIII 


Members who desire to propose new questions for study are 
invited to lay them before the Executive Council at the be- 
ginning of the session. This invitation must be extended by 
the president at the opening of the sessions. 


ARTICLE [X 


The president, after consultation with the Executive Coun- 
cil and the reporters, determines the order in which the sub- 
jects should be treated; but the program is in all cases under 
the control of the Assembly itself. 


PART IV 
Meetings 
ARTICLE X 


The meetings are devoted to scientific work. 

The titular members and the corresponding members take 
part in them. The former have the right to vote; the latter 
have the right merely to take part in the discussions. 

The meetings are not public. The Executive Council may, 
however, permit the attendance of the local authorities and 
press, as well as of persons who request to be admitted. 


ARTICLE XI 


Unless otherwise resolved by a special decision of the Exec- 
utive Council, the president delivers an address immediately 
after the opening of the first meeting. 

The secretary general presents a summary of the work of 
the last session and makes known the names of the assistant 


ga 


secretaries or editors whom he has appointed to aid him in 
drawing up the minutes of the session. 
The assistant secretaries or editors hold office only during 


the session. 
ARTICLE XII 


The treasurer is then requested to present his accounts to 
the Institute, and two auditors are thereupon elected to exam- 
ine the accounts of the treasurer. The auditors present their 
report in the course of the session (Constitution, Art. 1X). 


ARTICLE XIII 


Each meeting is opened by the reading of the minutes of 
the preceding meeting. 

Separate minutes are drawn up for each meeting, even 
when there are more than one on the same day; but the 
minutes of the morning meeting are read only at the opening 
of the next day’s meeting. 

The members present approve or revise the minutes. Re- 
vision can be requested only in the matter of wording, of 
errors, or of omissions. A decision cannot be changed in the 
minutes. 

The minutes of the last meeting of a session are approved 
by the president. 


ARTICLE XIV 


If the Executive Council deems it advisable to consider a 
matter as urgent, it may propose the immediate discussion 
thereof, and, if the majority of the members present agree, 
the matter may be put to vote in the course of this session; 
otherwise the proposition is of right postponed until the fol- 
lowing session. 

ARTICLE XV 


Committees may be appointed during a meeting for the 
examination of certain questions. These committees may, in 
turn, appoint sub-committees. 


26 


ARTICLE XVI 


The propositions of the reporters and of the committees 
form the basis of the deliberations in the meetings. 

The members of committees have the right to complete and 
develop their individual opinions. 


ARTICLE XVII 


The discussion is then opened. It takes place in the lan- 
guages indicated in Article XII of the constitution.. 

At the request of the members, the discussion may be 
summed up in French. 


ARTICLE XVIII 


No one may speak without having been previously recog- 
nized by the president. 

The latter notes the names of the members who request 
the floor and recognizes them in the order of their requests. 

The reporters, however, when the question on which they 
have made a report is under discussion, are not subject to the 
rule of speaking in turn. The same is true of the president 
of the committee. 


ARTICLE XIX 
The reading of an address is forbidden, unless specially 
authorized by the president. 
ARTICLE XX 


If a speaker digresses too far from the subject under con- 
sideration, the president calls his attention to the fact and re- 
quests him to speak to the question. 


ARTICLE XXI 


All propositions and all amendments are submitted, in writ- 
ing, to the president. 


27 


ARTICLE XXII 


If a point of order is raised during a deliberation, the dis- 
cussion of the main question is suspended until the assembly 
passes upon the point of order. 


ARTICLE XXIII 


The closing of the discussion may be proposed. The discus- 
sion may not, however, be declared closed, unless a two-thirds 
majority of the assembly so votes. 

If no one demands the floor or if it has been resolved 
to close the discussion, the president declares the discussion 
closed. Thereafter no one may be given the floor, except, in 
special cases, the reporter or the president of the committee. 


ARTICLE XXIV 


Before proceeding to a vote, the president submits to the 
assembly the order in which the questions will be voted upon. 

If there are objections to the order, the assembly passes 
upon them at once. 


ARTICLE XXV 


Amendments to amendments are put to vote before amend- 
ments, and the latter before the main question. Proposals 
purely and simply to reject the question are not considered 
amendments. 

Where there are more than two alternate main propositions, 
they are all put to vote, one after the other, and every member 
may vote for one of them. When a vote has thus been taken 
on all the propositions, if none of them has obtained a ma- 
jority, the members decide, by another ballot, which of the two 
propositions receiving the least number of votes must be elim- 
inated. The remaining propositions are then voted upon in 
the same manner until only one is left, upon which a definitive 
vote may be taken. 


28 


ARTICLE XX VI 


The adoption of an amendment to an amendment does not 
bind a member to vote for the amendment itself; neither does 
the adoption of an amendment obligate a member to vote in 
favor of the main proposition. 


ARTICLE XX VII 


When a proposition is capable of being divided, any member 
may request a vote by division. 


ARTICLE XXVIII 


When the proposition under consideration is drawn up in 
several articles, the proposition as a whole is first subjected 
to general discussion. 

After such discussion and the vote on its articles, the propo- 
sition as a whole is put to vote. Such vote may be postponed 
until a subsequent meeting. 


ARTICLE XXIX 


The voting is done by raising the hand. 

No one is bound to take part in a vote. If some of the 
members present abstain, the question is decided by the 
majority of those voting. 

In case of a tie, the proposition is considered defeated. 


ARTICLE XXX 


The vote may be taken by roll-call, if five members so 
request. There is always occasion for a roll-call on a scien- 
tific proposition as a whole. 

The minutes mention the names of the members voting for 
or against and the names of those who abstain. 


29 


ARTICLE XX XI 


The Institute may decide that a second deliberation should 
take place, either in the course of the session, or during the 
following session, or that its decisions be referred to a draft- 
ing committee to be designated by itself or by the Executive 
Council. 


OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN 
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 


OFFICERS 


Erinu Root, Honorary President 
JAMES Brown Scott, President 
ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ, Secretary General 
Luis ANDERSON, Treasurer 


EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 


Exinu Root 

James Brown Scott 

ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ 

Luis ANDERSON 

ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE 
Joaquin D. Casasus 


PERMANENT COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF QUESTIONS 
RELATING TO NEUTRALITY 


The Executive Council 
CHARTER MEMBERS 


Argentine Republic: Luis M. Draco 
Bolivia: ALBERTO GUTIERREZ 

Bragil: Ruy BARBOSA 

Chile: ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ 

Colombia: ANTONIO JOSE URIBE 

Costa Rica: Luis ANDERSON 

Cuba: ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE 
Dominican Republic: ANDRES J. MONTOLIO 
Ecuador: RAFAEL ARIZAGA 

Guatemala: ANTONIO BATRES JAUREGUI 
Haiti: J. N. LEGER 

Honduras: ALBERTO MEMBRENO 

Mexico: Joaguin D. Casasus 


31 


Nicaragua: SALVADOR CASTRILLO 

Panama: FEDERICO Boyp 

Paraguay: MANUEL GONDRA 

Peru: RAMON RIBEYRO 

Salvador: RaFaEL S. Lopez (deceased) 

Umited States of America: JAMES Brown ScotrT 
Uruguay: CarLos M. DE PENA 

Venesuela: Jost Git Fortout 


TITULAR MEMBERS 


Argentine Republic 
EDUARDO BIpAU 
CARLOS OcTAVIO BUNGE 
Luis M. Draco 
JOAQUIN V. GONZALEZ 
EDUARDO SARMIENTO LASPIUR 


Bolivia 
DANIEL SANCHEZ BUSTAMANTE 
ALBERTO GUTIERREZ 
ALBERTO DIEZ DE MEDINA 


CLAUDIO PINILLA 
Victor E. SANJiNES 


Brazil 
CLovis BEVILAQUA 
* Lavro MULLER 
RopDRIGO OcTAVIO 
MANOEL CICERO PERERGINO DA SILVA 
EPITACIO PESSOA 


Chile 
ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ 
Luis Barros BorcoNo 
ANTONIO HUNEEUS 
EpuARDO SUAREZ MUJICA 
ELIopORO YANES 


~ 


32 


Colombia 
NicoLas ESGUERRA 
ANTONIO JOSE URIBE 
Francisco Jost URRUTIA 
ADOLFO URUETA 
Jos&é Marta GONZALEZ VALENCIA 


Costa Rica 
Luis ANDERSON 
RicARDO GIMENES 
LEONIDAS PACHECO 
MANUEL CASTRO QUESADA 
C. GONZALEZ VIQUES 


Cuba 


ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE 
PaspLo DESVERNINE 

Ocravio GIBERGA 

FERNANDO SANCHEZ DE FUENTES 
RAFAEL MoNTORO 


Domimcan Republic 


FEDERICO HENRIQUES CARVAJAL 
MANUEL J. TRONCOSO DE LA CONCHA 
MANUEL ARTURO MACHADO 
ANDRES J. MONTOLIO 

ADOLFO ALEJANDRO NOUEL 


Ecuador 


RAFAEL Maria ARIZAGA 
ALEJANDRO CARDENAS 
GONZALO S. CORDOVA 

Victor MANUEL PENAHERRERA 
José Luts TAMAYO 


Guatemala 
Mariano Cruz 
ANTONIO BATRES JAUREGUI 
Jost Matos 
ALBERTO MENCOS 
CARLOS SALAZAR 


33 


Haiti 
Louis Borno 
EDMOND HERAUX 
PIERRE HuDICOURT 
Jacques N. LEGER 
SoLon MENos 


Honduras 


Fausto DaAvILA 
ALBERTO MEMBRENO 
ALBERTO UCLES 
RICARDO DE J. URRUTIA 
MARIANO VASQUEZ 


Mexico 


FrANcisco L. DE LA BARRA 
MANUEL CALERO 

Joaguin D. Casasus 
Victor MANUEL CASTILLO 
PEDRO LASCURAIN 


Nicaragua 


Mopesto BARRIOS 
ALEJANDRO CESAR 
PEDRO GONZALEZ 
CARLOS CUADRA PASOS 
Maximo H. ZEPEDA 


Panama 


Ricarpo J. ALFARO 
HARMODIO ARIAS 
Eusesio A. MorALES 
BELISARIO PoRRAS 
Ramon M. VALDES 


Paraguay 


EusEBIO AYALA 
CECILIO- BAEZ 

MANUEL GONDRA 
ANTOLIN IRALA 
FuLcencio R. Moreno 


34 


Peru 
TsAAc ALZAMORA 
Victor M. Maurtrua 
SoLon PoLo 
RAMON RIBEYRO 
MANUEL V. VILLARAN 
Salvador 


SALVADOR GALLEGOS 

Atonso REYES GUERRA 
VICTOR JEREZ 

MANUEL I. MorALES 
FRANCISCO MARTINEZ SUAREZ 


United States of America 


RoBERT BAcon 
ROBERT LANSING 
Extinu Root 

Leo S. Rowe 

JamMEs Brown Scott 


‘ Uruquay' 


DANIEL GARCIA ACEVEDO 
MANUEL ARBELAIZ 

Juan ANToNIo BuERO 

ApDOLFO BERRO GARCIA 

Juan ZORILLA DE SAN MARTIN 


V enezucla 
Simon BARCELO 
ARMINIO BorgJAS 
Jesus Royas FERNANDEZ 
Jost Git FortTouL 
F. Arroyo PAREJO 


hee ee 


= st, 


0112 0 aa 


Cuz } 


